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A thesis presented on the Vietnamese response to the changes in the Sino-Russian 
relations since the end of the Cold War, beginning with an overview of the Sino-
Russian relations during and after the Cold War, with an emphasis on the changes in the 
Sino-Russian relations, covering the overview of Vietnam’s relations with both Russia 
and China during the Cold War and the impact of the Sino-Russian relations on Viet 
Nam. Especially Vietnam’s reactions to the changes in the Sino-Russian relations since 
the end of the Cold War from the perspective of small and middle power’s foreign 
policy as well as policy recommendations for Viet Nam in order to balance its relations 
with both Russia and China to exploit the potentials and deepen its relations with these 
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1.1. Background and rationale 
Relations between great powers have a crucial role in international relations. The 
Russian federation and the People’s Republic of China are the two giant neighbors, 
sharing a common border of more than 4,300 km (Lampton, 2008, p. 201). Russia and 
China are two great powers in the world, having an important role in international 
relations. China is the world’s most populous country as well as  the largest country in 
Asia, while Russia is the world’s largest area spreading over two continents of Asia 
and Europe. Both countries are members of UN Security Council, having an 
important influence in the world. Sino-Russian relations have special significance 
regionally and globally. In the early 90s, China’s foreign policy with the Soviet Union 
based on peaceful coexistence, no debating awareness morphology (Lan, 1998, p. 25). 
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in1991, China’s diplomatic strategy is diplomacy 
with great power is key; diplomacy with neighbor is of primary importance; 
diplomacy with developing countries is the basis (Ha N. A., 2002). In its 
comprehensive foreign policy, China values relationship with key great powers, 
friendly relations with neighboring and regional countries. Chinese global diplomatic 
strategy is formed from 4 basic axes: neighbor diplomacy, great power diplomacy, 
regional diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy (My, 2007, p. 103).  
China’s Russia policy is “ strategic cooperative partnership of equality, mutual 
trust towards 21
st
 century”, with the motto “ no alliance, no confrontation, no against 
third country”, “ friendly neighbor” and “ balance of great power” (Vy, 2004, p. 27). 
This means China implement policy of neighbor, peace and stability; promoting the 
political-security, economic and trade tie with Russia; strengthen the relation with 
Russia to balance great power in the region, against US hegemony, fighting for a 
multipolar order. Meanwhile, Russia’s China policy also occupies an important 
position. In the first years, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia prioritized its 
relations with USA and Western countries. Since 1994, Russia has implemented 
policy of “ Eurasian orientation instead of the West leaning policy (Hung N. Q., 1999, 
p. 23). Russia has considered its relation with the CIS countries is the top priority, 
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with the US and Western countries are key priority, while promoting bilateral 
relations with China and focus relations with Asia-Pacific region. Since the end of the 
Cold War, Russia has changed its evaluation, perspective about China, from “despise” 
China to “respect” China”. China is an influent and great power. China is an 
economic power which has capacity to compete with US and has political prestige 
and voice in the international relations. China lies in the East of Russia as well as  the 
largest neighboring country. China’s geopolitics is reliable prop in the east of Russia. 
China is indispensable in creating peaceful surrounding and stability for the security 
and development of Russia. In international affairs, Russia has interests and closed 
stance with China on the issue of anti-hegemony and unilateralism of US.  Russia 
need to cooperate with and need support from China to combat the USA restraint and 
domination, to curb the penetration of Western expansionism in Central Asia, the 
traditional scope of its power projection and buffer zone  in this area.  
Viet Nam is neighboring country of China, and has traditional friendship with 
Russia. Both China and Russia are the great powers, having very important influence 
in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the foreign policy of Viet Nam is to combine the 
national power and era power, creating favorable conditions for the country’s 
development, improving Viet Nam’s position in the region and the world. Therefore, 
Vietnam has paid special attention on the promotion of relation with both China and 
Russia.  
The thesis aims at analyzing how Vietnam has responded to the changes in the 
Sino-Russian relation since the end of the Cold War. In order to clarify Vietnam’s 
response, beginning by the overview of Sino-Russian relations during and after the 
Cold War, then assesses of the impact of Sino-Russian relations on Vietnam, especially 
Vietnam’s reaction to this relation. Lastly, a number of policy recommendations will be 
offered for Vietnam to balance relations with Russia and China, for the development 
objectives of Vietnam. 
Therefore, there will be four chapters. The first chapter includes a general 
introduction, theoretical framework and literature review. The second chapter gives 
an overview of Sino-Russia relation in the Asia Pacific region during and after the Cold 
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War. In this chapter, the author will focus on analyzing the rise and fall of this 
relation; the interests and objectives in each country’s foreign policy as well as 
outcomes of the relation. The third chapter-the main chapter of the thesis focuses on 
Viet Nam’s response to the change in the Sino-Russian relation from the perspective of 
the middle power’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. This includes the 
assessment of the impact of Sino-Russian relations on Viet Nam, the analysis of 
interests and objectives in Vietnamese foreign policy to Russia and China as well as the 
evaluation of the measures implemented in each specific area of cooperation such as 
economics, security and defense. By analyzing Vietnam’s reactions to the changes in 
the Sino-Russia relations, we can see the development, adjustments, changes in 
Vietnam’s foreign policy to each of these two countries as well as the interests, 
objectives, implemented measures, existing problems and policy recommendations in 
the relations between Viet Nam and these two countries. The last chapter will go back 
to the theory and examine the meaning of the findings of the thesis in the light of 
the theory that author purport to use. 
RESEARCH QUESTION: 
How is Vietnam responding to the context of changing in the Sino-Russian 
relations since the end of the Cold War? 
 1.2. Theoretical framework 
 State motivation in realism in international relations theory 
The concept of national interests is an important one in international relations 
where the pursuit of national interests is a foundation in the realist school, is the 
legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. National interests are subjective for each 
nation. The conception of national interests lies at the core of the predominant 
"paradigm" governing the state's foreign policy (Deng, 1998, p. 308). Peter Byrd, a 
scholar of realist school, argues that national interest is used as a sort of foreign policy 
version of the term ‘public interest’—indicating what is best for the nation in its 
relations with other states (Byrd).Followers of realism often linked the two terms 
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“The interest of a State, National interest” to the issue of “ National security interest”. 
They are closely allied terms. Peter Byrd emphasized that national interest is also the 
way of using this figurative term of the politicians. National interest is simply 
understood what the politicians desire in the interests of their country (Byrd). 
States act to maximize what is often called the national interest. In other word, 
states try to maximize the likelihood that they will achieve whatever objectives they 
have set. These objectives include high level political concerns of assuring state 
survival– security matters-as well as the more mundane or low-political objectives in 
such fields as trade, finance, health and monetary exchange ( Paul R. Viotti and Mark 
V.Kauppi, 1993, p. 36). States use the power  they have to serve their interests or 
achieve their objectives. 
Having a look at the arguments of the other schools of theory, although there is 
some disagreements with realist school of thought, but generally there is agreement 
on the issue of national interest. Liberalism is a typical example. Followers of this 
school said that all countries pursue national interest, but this pursuit can be regulated 
and controlled, therefore it does not necessarily lead to conflict as realism forecast. 
While realists traditionally, and constructivists more recently, claim that 'the national 
interest' is a key explanatory tool in the analysis and understanding of contemporary 
foreign policy, Scott Burchill argues that beyond the narrow aspect of security policy, 
the national interest has little residual value as an insight into the motivations of state 
policy in the external realm (Burchill, 2005). Meanwhile, Constructivism asserted that 
national identity can not break away from the national interest. Identities are the basis 
of interests (Wendt A. , 1992, p. 398). Thus, national interest is the highest goal to 
which all countries pursue and it is also the root of the problems: Cooperation and 
competition, peace and war in international relations from the past to present. The 
cooperation takes place when there is a parallel in interest and contradict each other 
when conflict of interest (Wendt A. , 1992). However, even within realism school, 
there are not the same approach and consistent conception of this concept. An 
important cause is that the connotation of national interest is not invariable and 
depends on the specific circumstances and in certain contexts. At the same time, the 
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identification of the connotation of national interest as well as the order to pursue 
different interests is a matter of political decision-making area. Thus, in each period, 
each country with different political, cultural and economic situation will define 
differently the connotation of national interest in the different policy making process 
and of course also a such specific conditions and context, the implementation of 
policy to achieve national interests is also different. 
However, If states are driven solely by the requirement to maximize their own 
interests, then those with more power will use or abuse diplomacy and international 
law to their own benefit and to the detriment of others (Mirbagheri, 2000, p. 79). 
Several other scholars said that base solely on the national interest would create one 
of “might is right”, or power politics (Mirbagheri, 2000). 
According to Bruce W. Jentleson, respected scholar and foreign policy 
practitioner, the national interests of any countries will be the basis for making foreign 
policy, because no one has rejected argument that pursuing national interests is the 
core of the foreign policy choices of a country (Jentleson, 2007). According to 
another view, national interest is to be understood that is the best conditions for a 
country in relation to other state entities and at the same time as a tool for politicians 
to seek a support for a specific activity and target, especially in international relations 
(Byrd). National interest is a multifaceted issue, but first and foremost is the issue of 
security and survival of a nation. Some scholars also want to distinguish national 
interest related to external relations of a subject and public interests that are inside 
interests (Neuchterlein, 1973). However, due to the changes in the world political 
system, most researchers have combined two inclined interests in the concept of “ 
national interest”. All countries are making policies for the interests of government-
said John F. Kennedy- former US president. Han J. Morgenthau- a realist argued that 
the foreign policy of a country should promote the interests of the nation and should 
remove crusading spirit and ideal. A good foreign policy minimizes risks and 
maximizes benefits (Morgenthau, 1951). In the foreign policy of Viet Nam, the 
concept of state interests, national interests and national state interests are usually 
considered to be general connotation and is used interchangeably. However, in 
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today’s external activities, “serving national interest” is increasingly recognized as 
the supreme principle of the foreign policy of any countries and of  Viet Nam (Ha H. 
, 1992). It can be said that, so far, in the implementation of the foreign policy of most 
countries, national interest is understood to include two aspects: the minimum 
requirements for the integrity of geography, politics and culture; and the flexibility in 
foreign policy in general. 
Balancing and balance of power  is a key point of realism. Balancing refers to 
two forms of a state’s response to threats posed by an- other state. The more visible 
form of the two is external balancing, which involves building alliances with third 
parties on the international stage. The less apparent but more popular form is internal 
balancing, where a country builds up its domestic strengths to enhance its 
preparedness. These two forms of behavior rest on a common rationale As Kenneth 
Waltz has remarked, “Weakness invites control; strength tempts one to exercise it, if 
only for the ‘good’ of other people.”. Because disparity in power generates insecurity, 
the way of providing for security is to establish a balance of power (Waltz, 1979). In 
view of realist school of thought, characteristics of international politics are that 
there has not a nation or an international super power, which has the right to rule the 
world. However, this anarchy will not lead to confusion, as the world politics 
revolves around the principle of power balancing. Kenneth waltz said that balance of 
power is a property of the system of international relations. States joint alliances to 
protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a 
threat (Walt, 1985, p. 5). It is in the interest of states to curb a potential hegemony 
before it becomes too powerful so that they avoid falling victim to its rule once it 
achieves a dominant power status. It becomes a safer alternative to either improve 
ones own capabilities through self-help mechanisms or join alliances with states who 
cannot readily dominate in order to restrain and curb the one who can potentially 
dominate the system and undermine the survival of actors within it. Another reason 
why states in a majority of instances choose to balance and not bandwagon is because 
joining the balancing alliance allows them to have more influence and play a more 
important role in that alliance, whereas the alliance with a major power would not 
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allow them opportunities for a great deal of contribution and decisive capability as 
they would inevitably be dominated by their powerful ally (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). 
States prefer to preserve their freedom of action in an alliance rather than have orders 
imposed on them by aligning with a potential hegemony. If states are extremely 
vulnerable and insignificant, bandwagoning may be their only choice, however 
middle powers and states that have something to contribute and protect, will always 
balance in face of a rising power and a potential hegemony (Walt, 1985, p. 15). 
Small and middle states in the international relations. 
As Waltz argues, ‘‘Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the 
weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they 
are both more appreciated and safer, provided  of course, that the coalition they join 
a c h i e v e  enough defense or deterrent  strength to dissuade adversaries from 
attacking.’’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). Eduard Jordaan also argues that middle powers are 
states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and 
influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the 
world system. All middle powers display foreign policy behavior that stabilizes 
and legitimizes the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative 
initiatives (Jordaan, 2003, p. 2). After the cold war, the vast majority of countries 
have adjusted policies, tried best to avoid direct confrontation, taking national 
interest as objective and basis in order to behave in international relations. In 
domestic policy and foreign affairs, practicality and efficiency are put to the 
forefront. Primary basis for political force gathering between countries is still the 
national interest, on each issue, in each specific time, on many different levels with 
the intertwined and overlapping. The force gathering of middle and small countries is 
diverse and flexible, primarily by the geographic area. The role of  middle and small 
countries is increasing, but decisive factor for status and trend of forces gathering is 
still relations between major powers. In international relation, small and middle 
countries often pursue the foreign policy of nonalignment. That is policy option for 
these countries. In operational  terms,   it  may  be considered " a  tactical  
principle  designed  to extract  the widest  range of advantages from  a particular 
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kind of power configuration" (Rothstein, 1966, p. 405). Small and middle 
states have freedom to determine their own foreign policies without interference 
from outside powers. Practically nonalignment may mean  noninvolvement in 
superpower politics,  or more simply,  maintaining a diversity  of ties or 
commitments so as not to have to follow  blindly the demands of any one patron.  
Small and middle countries use this policy as an attempt  to avoid dependency on 
any one source of aid without going so far as to be totally isolated from 
international contacts (Gitelson, 1972, p. 31). However, this  policy  choice 
can  be  disadvantageous when the  major powers accuse the small or middle 
state  of  opportunism or refrain  from  competing for its  support during a  
period of detente, or will  probably  be  unable  to obtain  military, political,  
or economic support  during  a  crisis (Gitelson, 1972, p. 32). Despite force 
gathering is in any form, the security and development of the middle and small 
countries, at last still depend heavily on relationship with directly affected great 
powers. However, the middle and small countries will also try to make force 
gathering at the global scale to protect the public interests, in forums such as United 
Nations and non-aligned movements. The small and middle countries also 
increasingly demonstrated their importance in a current world of interwoven 
contradictions, complexities. Success in the socio-economic development, 
ideological factors did not play a key role in international relations, the major powers 
have not settled relations with each other, all of these have created for small and 
middle countries a great opportunity to enhance their roles. For the first time, in 
Asia-Pacific, an organization that includes small and middle countries have taken the 
lead and held leadership roles in the organization in the creation of a multilateral 
security forum with the participation of all the great powers and centers in the world. 
ASEAN Regional forum (ARF) has demonstrated the central role of ASEAN with 
consensus principle, emphasizing the dialogue process to build trust. Cooperation 
model of ASEAN is particularly well suited for regional security environment in the 
post cold war period, when there was no specific security threat. It can be asserted 
that regionalism is forming in Asia, where the small and middle countries have 
shown their roles the most clearly (Huong, Nguyen Thai Yen and Tuan, Pham Minh, 
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2003). Two world wars and the cold war in the XX century, after all, just for 
controlling market  and area of influence. Today, this can be done quite effectively 
through high-tech goods with cheap price or economic aid. Consequently, all of 
nations and states, large or small, weak or powerful will strengthen their cooperation 
and link together in different levels, first and foremost for their national state 
interests. 
For Viet Nam, the balance of relations with great powers is one of a focus in its 
foreign policy. In the study of international relations, the concept of “balance of 
relations” seems to be the derivative concept of  other terms of “balance” or 
“equilibrium” that has been analyzed deeply in the Realism school like “balance of 
power”, “balance of threat”…However, the practical application of policy of the 
nations show that the idea of “balance of relations” has been applied by quite a lot of 
countries, especially small and medium-sized countries. Viet Nam’s relation 
balancing policy is policy to ensure the “balance of power” is done. This means that, 
a country, especially, a small and medium-sized one implement foreign policy 
harmoniously, making sure not to rely on any other country in foreign relation, 
leading to dependence and being taken decisive affect to the fate of the nation by 
such country. States, when they are threatened, tend to attempt balancing the 
threatening power, alone if they can or with other if necessary (Telhami, Kenneth 
Waltz, Neorealism, and foreign policy, 2002, p. 159). Shibley Telhami also argues 
that to the extent that superpowers are the most powerful states, their power, their 
relations in relation to each other, their competition, and their foreign policy can 
affect the behavior of smaller states in dominant way (Telhami, 1990, p. 33). 
Alexander Vuving also asserted that balancing is all too familiar to Vietnamese 
policy makers. Considerations of relative power (“balance of forces”) are among the 
chief strategic imperatives taught by both the traditional and communist Vietnamese 
political cultures (Vuving, 2006, p. 808). Vietnamese foreign policy-making was 
formerly based on Neo-Realist notions: as capabilities  in the international system 
are distributed inequitably, Vietnam has adopted these policies to enhance its 
limited capabilities.  This was done  through  the adoption  of guerrilla  tactics and 
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by balancing against its enemy at each particular time -at first with the USSR 
and China against America, then with the USSR against China (Abuza, 1996, p. 
407). 
1.3. Literature review  
Vietnamese foreign policy has been an attractive subject to researchers at home and 
abroad. So far, there has many foreign famous authors, analyzing the foreign policy of 
Vietnam, as Carlyle A. Thayer, Ramses Armer, Zachary Abuza, Brantly Womack, 
James W. Morley and Masashi Nishihara and Alexander Vuving…with many articles 
and publications such as: "Vietnam foreign policy in transition", “ International 
relations Theory and Viet Nam”, "China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry", 
"Vietnam joins the world". They focused on  analysis of a specific policy in  bilateral 
relations between Vietnam and China, ASEAN, Laos, Cambodia with depth analysis of 
territorial disputes, Vietnam-China border war, Vietnam-Cambodia war and a series of 
related issues  related foreign policies of Vietnam during and after the Cold War. In 
Vietnam, a lot of material written about Vietnam's foreign policy. First is the documents 
of the Communist National Party Congress of VI, VII, VIII, IX, X , XI,  books of 
different authors such as Nguyen Duy Nien (2002),  " Diplomatic thought of Ho Chi 
Minh", The Central Party Commission on Thought and Culture (2005), "Vietnam 
foreign relationship in the new period"; Pham Binh Minh (2010)," Orientation of 
External Strategy to 2020"; Luu Van Loi (1998), " Fifty years of Vietnam diplomatic 
relations "; Vu Khoan (2007), " Security, development and influence in Vietnam's 
foreign policy"; Nguyen Khac Huynh (2006)," Foreign Affairs of Vietnam: The art of 
negotiation and policy"; Pham Manh Hung and Pham Minh Son (2008), "Vietnam 
Relations: Tradition and Present"; Institute of International Relations (1985, 1995, 
2002), "The victory and struggle on the diplomatic front";  "Modern Foreign Affairs for 
the cause of gaining independence and freedom 1945-1975 "; " Vietnam diplomatic for 
renovation cause from 1975 to 2000", " Contribute to explore Ho Chi Minh diplomatic 
ideology "; Vu Duong Huan (2009),"Some issues of international relations, foreign 
policy and diplomacy of Vietnam"; Trinh Muu, Nguyen Luc and Nguyen Hoang Giap 
(2005)" The process of implementing the foreign policy of the IX Congress of the 
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Communist Party Vietnam";  Institute of International Relations (2001-2002), " The 
international situation and foreign policy of Vietnam " and dozens of publication in 
book form of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Vietnam's foreign 
policy through period of times. Besides books, there also has many  journal articles 
about Vietnam’s foreign policy, published in Vietnam and the world, typically: Hong 
Ha (1992), "The situation of the world and the foreign policy of our Party "; Nguyen 
Manh Hung (2009), " The foreign policy of independence, peace, cooperation and 
development "; Pham Binh Minh (2011)," The guidline, the foreign policy of Vietnam 
in the new stage "; Nguyen Viet Thao (2011),"Continue the foreign policy of 
independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development"; Hoang Binh Quan 
(2010)" Developing deep relationships You're our international contacts in Congress 
Resolution ". 
Write about bilateral foreign policy of Vietnam- China, Vietnam-Russia, so far 
there has many research works, articles and materials on this topic, typically: Pham Cao 
Phong (2000) , "Economic and Trade Relations between Vietnam and China since 
1991"; Bui Khac But (2002), "Looking back on 200 years of Russian diplomacy and 
more than half a century of friendship and multifaceted cooperation of Vietnam-
Russia”; Nguyen An Ha (2011),“Vietnam-Russia Strategic Partnership: Potential and 
new developments"; Minh Hoai (2011), "Vietnam-Russia Economic Relations: Status 
and Prospects"; My Huong Ha (2011)," New Developments in Vietnam-Russia 
relations "; Nguyen Dinh Liem (2011)," Some problems of Sino-Vietnam relations in 
the begining 10 years of XXI century ";  Nguyen Luc and Nguyen Thi Thuy (2004)," 
The relationship between Vietnam and the Russian Federation from 1991 to date and 
prospects "; Do Tien Sam and Motoo Furuta (2003)," Open Foreign Policy of Vietnam 
and the Vietnam-China "; Andrey Tatarinop (2002)," New Evidence for the high level 
of  Vietnam-Russian Strategic partners relations and political trust. 
      Vietnam’s relations with Russia and China have caught the attention of the 
research community inside and outside Vietnam. To date, there has been a large body of 
literature on bilateral relation between Viet Nam with China and between Vietnam with 
Russia in the some fields of politics, diplomacy, culture, education, trade, economy, 
security and defense. However, the works on Vietnamese response to the changes in the 
 18 
 
Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War still very limited, even less. 
Hence, the thesis is an attempt to provide an overall view on Vietnam’s response to the 
Sino-Russian relation from the perspective of middle power foreign policy, while 
waiting for further studies to be published. This is also the very gap that the thesis is 
trying to fill. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
OVERVIEW OF CHINESE AND RUSSIAN 
RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC DURING 
THE COLD WAR 
2.1. The period of 1949-1959 
In the period 1949-1959, China and USSR are allies and anti-imperialism. After 
the success of the 1949 revolution, China was viewed as the Soviet Union's 'best 
friend' (Williams, 2009, p. 152). This time, China implemented “ lean to one-side” 
policy. In 1950, Chairman, Mao Zedong led the delegation of senior Chinese officials 
visited officially Soviet Union. On that basic, in February 1950, the Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed between Soviet Union and 
China. The alliance relationship was essential to China’s security and its military, 
economic and social development in the 1950s. (Sutter, 2008, p. 327). Sino- Soviet 
relations began developing in many fields, especially in politics and economy. Soviet 
granted long term loan of $ 300 million in credits for five years, which it would have 
to pay back with raw material at a one percent rate for China (Judith F. Kornberg and 
John R. Faust, 2005, p. 101), helped China  build 152 new industrial plants and 
supplied equipment to renovate and expand 141 firms (Hiep, 2007, p. 19). In addition, 
the Soviet Union also trained thousands of Chinese professionals, scientists and other  
technicians. Thanks to the help of the Soviet Union, China  recovered very fast. In 
short, Soviet aid, advisors, and guidelines were key features fostering the changes 
underway in China (Sutter, 2008, p. 327). 
 However, the Soviet Union-China relation has only existed for a short time until 
the appearance of conflicting viewpoints between the two countries on major 
international issues and socialism. Following Stalin's death in 1953, and Khrushchev's 
rise to power after 1955, Russian perceptions changed and China was seen as Russia's 
'enemy' (Williams, 2009, p. 152).  In 1956, after the 10
th
 Congress of Chinese 
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Communist Party was publicly against the Khrushchev’s doctrine of  “Peaceful 
Coexistence”, “the peace movement from capitalism to socialism”. During the 64th 
Congress of the Communist Party and in November 1957 in Moscow, two 
Communist Parties of  Soviet Union and China did not agree on some issues of  
principle in the communist and international workers movement. Consequently, in 
June 1960, the Soviet denounced Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed in October 1957, for 
nuclear technology cooperation, under which the Soviet Union was to provide China 
with a sample atomic bomb and technical data on its manufacture (Judith F. Kornberg 
and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 102). In November 1960, conflict between two 
Communist Parties become more intense than ever and can not be resolved. Soviet 
Government declared the cancellation of  economic, scientific and technological 
contract and total withdrawal of  10,000 Soviet advisors in China. Soviet aid was cut 
off. (Sutter, 2008, p. 327). This withdrawal of advisors signaled to the world that the 
two Communist giants were no longer partners (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 
2005, p. 102) 
2.2. The period of 1960-1979 
       From 1960 to 1979, the Soviet Union and China implemented hostile 
policies. Sino-Soviet relations collapsed completely. In the event of Kinmen, Matsu in 
August 1958, China wants the Soviet Union to exert tremendous pressure on the 
United States. However, the Soviet Union thought that Taiwan should not deserve in 
order Soviet Union clash with the United States. China said that the Soviet 
compromised. As the Soviet Union also criticized the “ triple  red flag”, “ Great Leap 
Forward” movements of China (Quy, 2004, p. 40). In April 1960, the People’s Daily 
newspaper of China openly criticised the leadership of the Soviet Union, started a 
fierce battle with the direction of Communist and international workers movement.  
The ideological struggle between the two  communist parties of  Soviet Union and 
China become more extreme harsh and public. China accused the Soviet revisionist, 
right-wing, “ socialist imperialism”, “ big hegemon”. The Soviet Union considered 
China as dogmatic  and  leftist. China evaluated Khrushev as revisionist, Khrushev’s 
communism is essentially deform of  socialism of  bourgeois style. In this period, the 
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Soviet Union announced the doctrine of  “ three revolutionary cascade” include the 
global socialist system, the national liberation movement, workers’ movement in the 
capitalist empire countries. In contrast, China proposed the theory of “ three worlds”: 
the United States and the Soviet Union is the first world, the developing countries in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and other countries around the world are third world, the 
other developed countries are the second world. 
The climax of this conflict was the Soviet and China border war in 1969. Armed 
conflict broke out between the Soviet Union  and China in Ussuri border areas, 
fighting also broke out in the islands in the Damman river of on-going Sino-Soviet 
dispute and some other places in the Soviet-China border. On 11 September 1969, the 
two sides agreed to reduce their troops at the  border and opened negotiations to 
resolve the dispute. The Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1960s, culminating in border 
clashes in 1968-69, added to this negative view, and in the 1970s as both Russia and 
China got closer to the US, they continued to see each other as enemies (Williams, 
2009, p. 156). After the border clashes in 1969, the two countries’s relations saw 
positive signs. In 1970, the two sides exchanged views and discussed a number of 
issues such as normalising the situation of  border and exchanging  ambassadors and 
strenthening economic ties. The two parties have agreed to negotiate the border at the 
Deputy Minister level. In 1971, the bilateral trade agreement was signed. However, a 
positive sign does not last long due to the impact of tentions in the two countries’s 
border areas. Soviet shares a 4,300 km common border with China (Williams, 2009, 
p. 155) , where a large forces of both sides concentrated. Both sides continued 
propaganda against each other. China  agitated its people about the Northern threat. 
At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the Chinese Government 
declared the protest, requests to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and said the 
action of the Soviet Union created a threat to the China’s security from the West. 
China, with the return of Deng Xiaoping, implemented the policies in favor of US and 





2.3. The period of 1979-1991 
         From 1979-1991, Sino-Soviet relations improved toward normalisation. In 
1979, the Chinese annouced their conditions for a normalisation of relations: reduce 
of Soviet troops in the borders areas, Soviet withdrwal from  Afghanistan and 
Mongolia, an  end to Soviet support for Vietnam’s invasion in Cambodia (Judith F. 
Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 105). In 1982, the XII Congress of the Chinese 
Communist party’s determination to take economic development as the key task. 
Instead of always considering the class struggle as the driving force of siocial 
development. At the same time, China began to implement foreign policy of peace, 
independence and autonomy. By 1982, the Soviet leader concluded that its post-1969 
strategy toward China had backfired (Sutter, 2008, p. 328). In 1985, the Soviet Union 
made reform, moving away from confrontation to dialogue with the previous enemy 
(Dittmer, 1992).Russian attitudes towards China did not soften until the 1980s, when 
Mikhail Gorbachev made his historic visit to Beijing in June 1989 (Williams, 2009, p. 
152). In July 1986 and in September 1988, the Soviet leader announced, the Soviet 
Union would reduce troops in the east and withdraw armed forces from Afghnistan, 
Mongolia toward normalising relations with China. In 1987, talks began between the 
Soviet and the Chinese on issues including demarcation of the frontier (Judith F. 
Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 105) in The official visit of China by Soviet 
Union General secretary Gorbachev in May 1989 marked the complete normalisation 
of relations between the two countries. Two sides issued a joint statement about the 
two countries, the two Communist Parties were completely normal. Changes within 
China itself, as a result of Deng Xiaoping's shift towards reform and liberalization in 
the same period, also paved the way for a more open Chinese foreign policy 
facilitating a gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet relations (Williams, 2009, p. 152). 
After normalisation, the Soviet Union and China were initially made friendly relations 
of cooperation  between the two countries on the basic of peaceful coexistence, 
equality and mutual benefits. Soviet-Chinese cooperation developed in many areas, 
but the highlight is the field of economics, trade, politics and solve the border issue. In 
1989, the total value of Sino-Soviet foreign trade reached 2.4 billion rubles, increased 
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by 13 times compare to 1986; in 1990, approximately 3 billion rubles, while the same 
year, the total China-US trade was 12 billion rubles (Quy, 2004, p. 65). In May 1991, 
General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang 
Zemin paid an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union marked a new development 
in the Sino-Soviet relations. In 1989, Soviet Union and China have back to discuss the 
Soviet-Chinese border issue. Two countries have their troops on the common border 
down to the lowest level; implementing a number of mearsures to ensure the stability, 
the security of  national frontiers, building, consolidating the mutual understanding 
and trust. In May, 1991, The Soviet Union and China signed an Agreement on  border 
issues, nearly 300 years after the first Russo-Chinese border treaty (Judith F. 
Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 107). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 
end of 1991, the Soviet Union and China relations are transformed into Russian-
Chinese relations (Hiep, Quan hệ Liên Xô và Trung Quốc thời kỳ chiến tranh lạnh { 
Relations between the Soviet Union and China in the Cold War era}, 2007).   
About this relation during this time, Shlapentokh writes: 'In the 50 years after the 
victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, Russians saw China as an ally for seven 
years (1949-56) and for thirty years they looked at China as a dangerous enemy 
(1957-87) (Williams, 2009, p. 152). In sum, during thís  time, Russia and China have 
worked hard to overcome the consequences of the confrontation for nearly 30 years 
between the two countries. This rivalry has caused great damage on both sides in 
terms of politics, materials and spirituals. The first milestone opening precondition for 
a recovery period of diplomatic relation, neighborliness is the Soviet Union withdrew 
its military forces from the border of Mongolia and China in early 1991. 
2.4. The Sino- Russian relations in the Asia Pacific in the post-cold war 
era 
2.4.1. Bilateral political ties 
       Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation and China 
have established diplomatic relation (27 December 1991) and then conducted a series 
of high level meetings to develop bilateral relations in many aspects. The relationship 
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between Russia and China improved steadily to the extent that it is enjoying the best 
time of its history at the governmental level (Guang, 2008, p. 239). The picture  in 
Central Asia has been changed, creating a wide buffer zone between the two 
countries. The Sino-Russian relationship has gained some typical achievements in the 
several aspects such as the establishment of strategic partnership; formation of an 
effective mechanism of summit meetings; the resolve of historical problems that once 
obstructed the development of their relationship; consensus and implementation of 
effective cooperation in the international arena; steady development of security 
cooperation of the two countries. Instead of the perception of each other as threat, 
both are finding more and more common interests in the region and in the world 
(Guang, 2008, pp. 239-240) 
During Yeltsin administration (1991-1999), two countries have established a 
strategic cooperative partnership that is now institutionalized in the form of legal 
document. during his tenure, president Boris Yeltsin paid state visits to china four 
times. first visit took place in December 1992, and two countries made joint 
declaration on foundation of Russo-Chinese relation, affirming the two countries 
viewed each other as friendly. in September 1994, in second visit to China, Boris 
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed Sino-Russian joint statement. The two countries 
determined to build the relationship of constructive cooperation. In 1996, both sides 
declared their intention to set up a strategic cooperative partnership oriented toward 
the twenty- first century, during the president Yeltsin’s third visit to China. When 
president Jiang visited Russia in April 1997, both countries signed the joint statement 
by China and Russia on multipolarization in the world and establishment of a new 
international order, showing consensus on both the opposition to group politics and 
the strengthening of their  role (Guang, 2008, p. 240).  In 1999, when president 
Yeltsin visited China, both countries signed an agreement, agreeing to find a way to 
resolve the last dispute on three islands in the Amur river, on the principle of shelving 
disputes for joint development (Guang, 2008, p. 239). In 2000, President Putin visited 
china two times in January and July. china and Russia emphasized the further 





 century and a series of documents were signed as such anti-missile declaration of 
Sino-Russia and Bejing declaration. on 16 July 2001, in Moscow, china and Russia 
signed good neighborly treaty of friendship and cooperation, symbolizing the 
initiation of a new stage of the bilateral relationship. In December 2002, President 
Putin also paid three-day visit to china. during this visit, the two sides signed Sino-
Russian joint statement. Russia was the first foreign country that president Hu Jintao 
visited in may 2003 after his 2002 elevation to the position of general secretary of the 
CCP (Chinese communist party) (Lampton, 2008, p. 200). In October 2004, president 
Putin and president Hu signed a final agreement about the Amur river islands. the 
disputes  surrounding the 4,300 km-long Sino-Russian borders are now completely 
resolved (Guang, 2008, p. 239). in 2005, the last territorial issues between china and 
Russia were thoroughly settled. Beijing and Moscow also cooperate in the context of 
SCO (shanghai cooperation organization), with a shared objectives of keeping the us 
military presence and influence in central Asia to  minimum as well as  enlarging 
regional economic cooperation and confronting terrorists. \Russia and china also 
agreed on insisting on a dominant role for the un in search for and use of political, 
diplomatic, economic, even military lever for influencing the international situation 
(Lampton, 2008, p. 200). in 2007, the two countries set up a hotline to jointly resolve 
quickly issues of mutual concern. 
 In May 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev visited China. During this visit, the 
two countries made joint statement on world’s issues. In 2008, president Medvedev 
and President Hu Jintao met 5 times. Russia and Chinas have resolved border dispute 
lasted for more than 40 years (the dispute has been pushing the two countries to the 
conflict in 1960s and 1970s). This is one of clearest sings of the warming in the 
Russo-Chinese relation. Russia and China focused more attention on strategic issues 
as such promoting global cooperation on economy and  protection of environment and 
multipolarized trend in the world as well as anti-terrorism, nuclear weapons 
monitoring, against using human rights to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries. It can be said that, the most important achievement of the Sino-Russian 
relation since the end of the Cold War is that the two countries have built partnership 
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relation, strategic partnership- a new paradigm of international relation, creating the 
solid foundation for the long term and sustainable development of the relation 
between the two countries. Russia and China have steadily consolidated the relation, 
resolved many problems in the relation left by the history, creating preconditions for 
economic cooperation and coordination in the international arena. 
2.4.2. Bilateral economic and trade ties 
The Chinese and Russian economies have become more integrated during the 
post-Soviet era. As early as 1991, Sino-Russia’s economic- trade relation was quickly 
restored, strengthened and developed. The regular visits of the leaders of the two 
countries have created favorable conditions for the expansion of economic relations 
between the two countries. The government of two countries signed range of 
economic-trade agreements, provided range of policies and specific directing 
measures to expand economic and trade cooperation. Bilateral cooperation achieved 
good results in various fields such as construction, infrastructure development, steel 
industry, chemicals, oil and gas drilling, consumer good production, food and 
financial and baking sectors. If the trade turnover between the two countries reached $ 
5.2 billion in 1992, $ 8 billion in 1993. In 2001-2005 period, bilateral trade grew three 
times, from $ 10,67 billion to $29.1 billion (Lampton, 2008, p. 200). In late 2004, 
President Putin welcomed Beijing’s expression of interest in making $12 billion of 
investment in Russia. From $ 11.7 billion in 2003 up to nearly 60 billion dollars in 
2010, and respectively in 2012 was  nearly 100 billion dollars. Currently, China is 
Russia’s leading partner in Asia-Pacific region. Two parties contribute capital to 
establish joint stock company to create free zone along the borders. Nearly 30 joint 
ventures were founded in Russia specializing in agricultural products, leathers, 
garments, wood and hotel services. After 1992, Russia and China signed 613 labor 
contracts with capital of more than $ 1 billion. China has sent more than 16000 
laborers to work in Russia and constructed 347 companies in Russia. Russia and CIS 
countries have built 318 companies in Heilongjiang, China (www.mid.ru). The two 
countries also have established financial investment company, Sino-Russian and 
Russo-Chinese joint venture banks to develop trade and economic relations. The two 
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sides had reached an agreement that Russia will construct oil refineries worth 5 billion 
dollars in Tianjin, China, and build at least 500 gas distribution stations in China, 
construct nuclear power plants and modernize 250 current Chinese enterprises that 
was built with the help of the former Soviet Union. China also pledged to extend 
credit to the Russia, worth 25 billion dollars to build an oil pipeline from Eastern 
Siberia of Russia to the Asia-Pacific region, in return, Russia will supply oil for China 
in 20 years, from 2011 to 2030 with a volume of 30 million tons / year and the price 
of 2/3 of the market price. Since 2015, every year Russia will sell China 30 billion m3 
of gas. Sino-Russian trade and economic cooperation is marked by mutual 
complementariness. It has a great potential and vast prospects. Along with economy, 
China also focused on economic cooperation with Russia in the transfer of technology 
and science such as aerospace, defense and high-tech of Russia. Militarily, Beijing is 
one of biggest purchaser of Russian armaments and related technology. 
2.4.3. Cooperation in the international and regional matters. 
Russia and China have many parallel interests in the international and regional 
matters. Regional cooperation is an important aspect of the Sino-Russian relations. In 
April 1996, the two countries jointly organized Shanghai Cooperation Forum with the 
participation of China, Russia and 4 Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and   Uzbekistan). In 2001, the forum has expanded into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization- a new model of cooperation in the post Cold War world. 
This organization has worked effectively in a range of issues such as terrorism, 
separatism and promoting cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and security. 
In terms of international arena, as a member of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the two countries have shared interests on many fundamental international 
issues, from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the reform of the world financial 
institutions, hot issue of the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear issue, the Korean 
peninsular…As a member of BRIC group, Russia and China have not accepted a 
unipolar world with America’s dominant position. Russia and China have had agreed 
stance for the adoption of political and diplomatic measures to reach a  comprehensive 
and long-term agreement on the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea. The two 
 28 
 
countries also have jointly promoted the process of reforming the United Nations, 
ensure supremacy of institutions in solving the problems of security,  protest the abuse 
of economic sanctions in solving international crises, prevent unilateralism, striving for 
a space without "between stars war." weapons. 
2.4.4. Military cooperation  
Most analysts agree that Russia’s commercial motivations  have dominated  in 
its arms sales relationship  with  China (Robert H.Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 
2003, pp. 719-720). Over the last years, weapons and equipment provided to China 
accounted for more than 40% share of exports of the Russian military, giving Russia 
from 1.8 billion dollars to 2.5 billion dollars each years. The Russian military has 
provided weapons to China for more than 30 years (since 1990), mainly aircraft, naval 
equipment, worth in excess of 25 billion dollars. The first exchange of military 
visits  in  several decades occurred  in  June  1990,  and  resumed  arms sales were 
apparently on the agenda. The same year, Moscow agreed to sell 24 SU-27s to 
China. Combat aircraft have continued  to be the chief component of Russian 
deliveries; China has now purchased at least six dozen transcontinental  SU-27 
fighters, which are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow  trip  in two and one-
half hours with one mid-air  refueling.  In 1999, China concluded an agreement, 
valued at more than $2 billion,  for 40 to 60 SU-30sF two-seat multipurpose 
fighters capable (with certain modifications)  of carrying  nuclear weapons. . China 
currently owns more than 280 combat aircraft Su-27 and Su-30 of Russia (Robert 
H.Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 2003, pp. 719-720). China also buying a large 
number the combat aircraft Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171 as well as motors for these 
aircrafts of this type. Russia has built 4 Sovremennyi-class destroyers for the Chinese 
navy equipped  with  supersonic  missiles,  12 diesel-powered submarines All these 
submarines  are equipped missiles with nuclear warheads. Beijing also purchased 60 
air defense systems, several armored vehicles, artillery and helicopters of  
multifunctional type from Russia,  S-300 surface-to-air missile complexes, T-72 
tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology for advanced gas 
centrifuges used in uranium enrichment  and for MIRVed missiles (Robert 
 29 
 
H.Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 2003, pp. 719-720). Large numbers of Russian 
scientists and engineers with long-term contracts are working   in  Chinese design  
bureaus  and  defense plants,  Chinese engineers are training  at Russian facilities, 





CHAPTER 3:  
VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO THE CHANGES 
IN THE SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SINCE THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR 
 3.1. Review of Vietnam’s relation with Russia and China in the post- 
Cold War. 
3.1.1. Vietnam’s relation with Russia 
In 1950, formal diplomatic relations between the So Viet Union and Vietnam 
were established. Vietnam-Soviet Union Relations was a cornerstone of the 
Vietnamese foreign policy (Ha H. , 1992, p. 153). Soviet Union provided great help 
and assistance to Vietnam during the French war, anti-American war and nation-
building cause of Vietnamese people. Vietnam is always grateful to the former Soviet 
Union and Russia for their wholehearted and effective assistance to the country during 
its national liberation and reunification in the past and construction and socio-
economic development at present. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Viet Nam and Russian Federation has set up an official diplomatic relation on 
the principles of equality and mutual benefits. Vietnam-Russian relation is the legacy 
of the past Vietnam-So Viet Union relations. In the period of 1991-1993, Vietnam-
Russian relation developed in the difficult stage. The relationship was in the 
stagnation and declined sharply and apparently. The main reason is that during this 
period, Russia implemented Atlantic-oriented policy, focused mainly on the 
development of  relationship with USA and the Western capitalist countries, on 
contrary, Vietnam considered relationship with neighboring and Southeast Asian 
countries as a top policy (Giap N. H., 1999). Vietnam actually found it’s was so 
difficult to find feasible plan to maintain normal relation with Russia. Moreover, 
Vietnam’s debt to Russia(inherited from Soviet Union) also became the main obstacle 
for Vietnam-Russia relations. Since 1994, The Russia implemented “ Eurasian” 
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orientation foreign policy instead of “Atlantic” orientation with more emphasis on 
developing partnership with Asia-Pacific countries, especially with CIS countries, 
China, Indian and ASEAN. This is a stage of which the relationship between Vietnam 
and Russia has been gradually restored and improved positively (Phach, 1999, p. 
155),  with the groundbreaking effort to create a new legal framework to meet the 
development needs of .relations between Vietnam and Russia. From 1994 to 1996, 
Vietnam-Russian relation has started a new development with positive and realistic 
signs. Russia has developed with East Asian and Asia-pacific countries in order to 
balance “ East-West relation”.  Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s first 
official visit to Russia with the signing of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of friendly 
relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Russian Federation (6-
1994) has reflected the determination of both two sides to create basis for new 
comprehensive platform for the development of the bilateral relations in the new 
situation. This treaty creates a new legal foundation and the guiding principles of 
respect for national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. From 1997 to 
1999, the Vietnam-Rusian relations were raised to a new hight with road-opening role 
of the field of politics and diplomacy. The first visit to Vietnam by Russian Prime 
Minister V. Checnomudin in November 1997 reflected the growing concern of 
Russia’s demand fro the development of comprehensive cooperation with Vietnam.In 
August 1998, State President of Viet Nam visited to Russia. The visit marked the 
highest-level efforts, contribute to boosting the bilateral  relation to a high 
development. During this visit, Vietnam and Russia signed Mutual legal assistance 
agreement; agreement on cooperation in construction and operation of Dung Quat Oil 
refinery Factory; agreement on payment between the two banks; agreement on 
cooperation between two Ministries of Justice. Vietnam-Russian relation under 
BorisYeltsin administration was not commensurate with the demand of the two sides. 
Bilateral relation was stalled in the long time.Cooperation in all fields declined 
sharply, until 1994, this relations saw a positive signs. From 2000 to 2008 under Putin 
administration. in September 2000, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited Russia; in 
October 2002, and July 2010, Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh visited 
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Russia; Vietnamese State President visited to Russia in May 2004, October 2008; 
President of Russian Federation visited Vietnam in 2001, in 2006 and in 2010; Prime 
Minister of Russian Federation visited Vietnam in March 2002 and February 2006 
(http://www.vietnam.mid.ru/vn/viet_01.html) and recent visit of Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in May 2013. Vietnam and Russian relations in this 
period reflected the recognition of the urgency and effort in putting forward this 
relation over the long term and stable strategic relation (Giap N. H., 1999). The 
frequent exchange of high-level visits between Vietnam and Russia reinforces 
closeness, mutual understanding of diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
the two governments. Vietnam-Russian relation after 1991, especially in the late 90s 
of 20th century has created an important premise to establish strategic partnership (Vu 
Dinh Hoe & Nguyen Hoang Giap, 2008, p. 91). 
3.1.2. Vietnam’s relations with China 
 In the feudalistic period, Vietnam had nearly a thousand years under direct rule 
and domination of Chinese State. Vietnam was a district in the administrative 
structure of Chinese State. During  this  long  period,  while  the  Vietnamese  
selectively  assimilated  much of  Chinese  culture,  they  remained  intensely  
nationalist (Guan, 1998, p. 1122). The  links between  China  and  Vietnam  were  
indeed  close,  and  China and  Chinese  values  had great influence  on  Vietnamese 
society (Amer, 1993, p. 316).  In the colonial period, both Vietnam and China had to 
face colonialism. Vietnam was under French domination, both  countries  were  weak  
and  had  to  come  to  terms  with  the intrusion  of  the  West.  Although  Vietnam  
was  colonized  and  China  was  not, they  shared  a  sense  of having  common  
weaknesses  and fates (Guan, 1998, p. 1139).  On 2 Sep 1945, State of Democratic 
republic of Viet Nam was born and on 1 October 1949, People’s Republic of China 
was established. Since then the Sino-Vietnamese relation entered the new stage. 
China was the first country to recognize the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. 
During the  two decades beginning in  the  mid-1950s,  China provided the DRV  with  
extensive  economic  and military assistance. Apart from  material assistance,  China  
also  sent  thousands  of advisers  to  Vietnam  to assist  in various  areas  of society 
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(Amer, 1993, p. 319). China also helped Vietnam open the Vietnam’s  way of 
communication with the Soviet Union ad other socialist countries, gave Vietnam a 
large rear, strongly provided Vietnam with materials (weapon aid, military equipment, 
food, medicin. During the  second  half  of  the  1950s  and  the early  1960s, relations 
between  China  and  the  DRV  were very close  and  there  were  no  obvious issues  
of disagreement between  the  two  states. es), politics, spiritual; cleared the transit 
route through China for foreign aid to Vietnam (Amer, 1993, p. 317). In the war 
against French, China has sent advisors to help Vietnam to train staff for number of 
industries, provided important and effective assistance (Giap V. N., 1999, pp. 14-15). 
China was a biggest providing weapon country for Vietnam at the end of the war of 
the Vietnamese people against the French (MOFA, 1979).  Prior to  the  Democratic 
Republic of  Vietnam's (DRV)  victory over  the  South in  1975,  China had been  
Vietnam's largest benefactor,  contributing  $20  million of  military  and  
development  aid to Ha noi (Roper, 2000, p. 1019). In the war against the United 
States and the South Vietnamese regime, especially during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
China was Hanoi’s most enthusiastic backer. China extended  economic  and  military 
aid,  provided  sanctuaries inside  South  China, and  made available  logistic  lines  
running across  China from  the  Soviet  Union, even deployed  a  large  numbers of  
Chinese troops  to  the Vietnam during 1965-1968 (Garver, 1981, p. 447). In April 
1975, the Sai Gon Government (South Regime) was collapsed, the Southern of 
Vietnam was entirely liberated, and Vietnam reunified. Also since 1975, Pol pot (in 
Cambodia) has increased invasion operation  over Vietnam, and in 1978, the conflict 
at Southwestern Border of Vietnam have grown into major war. Cambodian issue has 
made Vietnam-China relation deteriorated. In the end of 1976, border conflict 
between Vietnam and China broke out at Cao Bang and Lang Son region. Vietnam 
and China has carried out negotiation without results. In 1978, China always acted 
unfriendly to Vietnam such as claims of the “ Hoa people” ( Vietnamese of Chinese 
origins) about  alleged  mistreatment in  Vietnam (Leighton, 1978), cut off 72 aided 
works, cut off totally economic aid and total withdrawal of its experts. On 17 Feb 
1979, 300.000 Chinese troops attacked Vietnam across wholly Vietnam-China border 
(Bin, 2001, p. 311).  The  issues  involved in the  Sino-  Vietnamese conflict  are  
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numerous  and complex (Burto, 1979, p. 700). The  origins of  the  Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict  leading  to  the  border war in  early  1979 are  deeply  rooted  in  history,  
geography,  clash  of  national  interests, and  policy  differences  between  the  
"dragon"  and  the "'smaller  dragon (Hung N. M., 1979, p. 1037). While Carlyle  A. 
Thaye argues that the  central  issue  in  the  breakdown  of  Sino-Vietnamese 
relations  were both  ideological  factors  and  national  interests (Thaye, 1994, p. 513) 
. Other scholar  explained  it was Vietnam's  failure  to  maintain  a  balance  in  its  
relations  with  China  and  the  former  Soviet  Union.  When  China  cut  off  all  
economic  aid  to  Vietnam  in  1978  and  Vietnam-U.S.  negotiations  to  normalize 
relations  broke  down,  Vietnam  turned  to  the  Soviet  Union (Guan, 1998, p. 1122). 
In 1986, Vietnam has carried out Renovation reform. Vietnam has actively promoted 
the normalization of relation with China and finally succeeded on November 1991. 
Vietnam and China issued a joint statement confirming the bilateral relations was re-
normalized. 
3.2. The impact of the Sino-Russian relations on Vietnam 
Both China and Russia have an important role in the Vietnam’s foreign policy of 
diversification and multilateral independence. China is the major power, the socialist 
country and neighbor while Russia also both great power and traditional friendly 
country of Vietnam. Both countries have a certain influence in the region. Thus, the 
good development  of relationship between Vietnam with China and Russia will 
create favorable conditions for Vietnam to expand its relations with other countries in 
the world. Therefore, Vietnam  attaches great importance to developing relations with 
China and Russia. Sino-Russian strategic partnership in Asia-Pacific make chance for 
Vietnam to take advantage of both Russia and China for its socio-economic 
development, as well as enhancement of its capacity and competitiveness in the 
process of  regional and international integration. As Russia and China have relations 
with Vietnam, so this is an opportunity for Vietnam to take advantage of the help and 
assistance of two countries in terms of  investment in capital, technology, and exploit 
the potential of the two countries to successfully implement the industrialization and 
modernization of the country. Meanwhile, Vietnam will have more favorable 
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conditions to the struggle against external forces on the political issues, religion and 
human rights. At the same time, the mutual restraint between Russia and China 
contributes to increase Vietnam’s role in particular, and other Southeast Asian 
countries in general as well as contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability and 
cooperation in the region. 
For multilateral mechanisms, both China and Russia are big power, having role in 
the region as well as multilateral institutions (such as permanent member of Security 
Council of United Nations, APEC, ARF), so Vietnam can leverage strategic partnership 
relations with China and Russia to promote the role of these mechanisms in order to 
improve its position in the region and around the world. This is also the way to balance 
relations with major countries. However, the cooperation between two great powers, 
China and Russia could cause disadvantages for Vietnam. First, Vietnam will have to 
suffer disadvantages and negative effects when Russia and China make mutual restraint 
policy. The separate and the difference in force gathering between Russia and China on 
many issues will affect the interests of Vietnam. As a small country, Vietnam can not 
avoid being sucked into certain vortex and inevitable threat from the other side. In 
particular, Vietnam now is facing enormous challenges due to the China’s rising and its 
many political ambitions in the region, along with pragmatic policies and intentions to 
entice ASEAN countries, making the ASEAN’s unity and consensus seriously eroded. 
This will affect the role and strength of ASEAN in general and  the individual member 
State in particular, including Vietnam. On the other hand, with its rising role, China will 
implement the intent of advance toward the South, to make its own calculations in the 
East China Sea strategy. In short, the Russo-Chinese relations have two sided impact on 
Vietnam. 
3.3. Vietnamese response to the Sino-Russian relations in terms of 
economy 
Viet Nam has strategic partnership with both Russia and China. However, the level 
of Vietnam’s partnership with each country is different. Basically, Russia-China 
partnership has positive impact upon the relationship of each country toward Viet Nam. 
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Russia and China seem to have a division of interest quite clearly in Southeast Asia and 
in Viet Nam. Southeast Asia is first of China’s  area of influence. Russian penetration in 
Southeast Asia and Viet Nam at a certain level and will not harm the interests of China.  
Russia and China would never for Viet Nam to have conflict directly, thus  Russia-
China relations create stability in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam. Balanced foreign 
policy in relation to Russia and China, on the one hand, will help the healthy 
development of Viet Nam-Russia and Viet Nam-China relations, on the other hand, 
will not make the relations with Russia to impede the relations with China and vice 
versa, nor for these two countries to take advantage of Viet Nam as bargaining chip 
in their relations with each other. Viet Nam as a small and middle country, as 
neighboring country of China, and as traditional friendship country of Russia, will 
have both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, Viet Nam can take 
advantage of this relationship to economic development and politics. On the other 
hand, Viet Nam can limit the negative impacts based on its foreign policy of 
openness, multilateralism and diversification. 
From 1991, along with the normalization of political relations, Vietnam’s 
economic relation with China has been restored and developed steadily. Viet Nam has 
signed more than 20 documents covering trade and economy cooperation matters. (Gu 
Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, 2000, p. 1045). These  agreements  have  covered a  
range of matters,  including  economic  and  trade  issues;  air,  sea, and  rail  
transportation; cultural  affairs;  public security  questions;  customs  and  taxation  
matters;  and other subjects, such as trade agreement in 1991, agreement on economic 
and technical cooperation in 1992, agreement on payment and cooperation between 
banks of the two countries in 1993, agreement on the establishment of Committee on 
economy and trade cooperation between Vietnam and China in 1994; agreement on 
border trade in 1998…In addition, many Vietnamese central ministries and local 
governments also signed documents on bilateral economic cooperation, especially 
between Yunnan, Guangxi of China and the northern border province of Vietnam. So 
far, Vietnam and China have opened 25 pairs of international and national border 
gates on the common land border between. Two -way trade turnover between 
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Vietnam and China is growing fast. From 32 million in 1991 to $ 2.8 billion in 2001, 
increasing 87 times (Truong, 2013).  In 2001, the leaders of Vietnam and China set 
out the target till 2005,  two-way trade turnover will be achieved $ 5 billion. In 2003, 
this target was achieved, in 2005,  it increased nearly double with $ 9.8 billion. In 
2003, two Prime Ministers set out goals of getting $10 billion in 2010, and then lift up 
to $15 billion in two-way trade. In 2007, this target was achieved up to $15.8 billion. 
In 2008, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and his Chinese counterpart 
pledged to implement two-way trade target of $ 25 billion in 2010, but at the same 
time, this target was achieved up to $ 27 billion. In 2011, that figure was $ 35.1 
billion and in 2012 was up to $ 41 billion (Truong, 2013). However, in trading with 
China  ,Vietnam always in the state of deficit as in 2012 was $ 16.3 billion. Vietnam 
exports to the Chinese market more than 100 products, while China exports to 
Vietnamese markets up to 200 items. The Vietnam’s deficit from China, in constant 
years, always accounted up to 85-90 % total level of Vietnam’s deficit. It is clear that 
Vietnam depends so much on goods imported from China and Vietnam trade balance 
was largely deficit in trade with China (Truong, 2013). Vietnam’s export also being 
dependent on China. In addition, Vietnamese enterprises are increasing dependent on 
raw material imported from China. On the other hand, China’s FDI in Vietnam is 
growing up. After 9 years since the normalization in November 1991 to December 
1999, China has 76 invested projects with total capital of $ 120 million. Within 10 
years, from 1999 to 2009, China has increased to 657 projects with total registered 
capital of more than $ 2.67 billion. In 2009, China ranked 11 among 43 countries and 
territories investing in Vietnam (Hoa, 2010). Currently, Chinese investment has 
presented in 52 provinces/cities of Vietnam (Hoa, 2010). Field of Chinese investment 
in Vietnam is very diverse from hotels, restaurants services to food processing and 
production of beer. Over time, the Chinese government has also dedicated to Vietnam 
a number of grants and concessional credits, such as technical improving project of 
Thai Nguyen steel plant and Bac Giang fertilizer plant  by approximately $ 55 million 
(of which one third is non-refundable). Nearly $ 300 million loan with no interest to 
invest for a number of projects such as Cao Ngan power plant, Rao Quan 
hydroelectric work, Da Nang textile mill.; Non-refundable aid worth $ 30 million and 
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concessional credit $ 40.5 million were signed during the visit to China by Party 
General Secretary Nong Duc Manh in December 2001. Chinese investment in 
Vietnam in the first 9 years (1991-2000) the average investment capital of a project 
was relatively small, about $1.5 million, much smaller than the average size of the 
project. Investment rate has increased, but not mutant, scale of project is small and 
slow growth. These characteristics demonstrate Chinese investors are in the 
exploration phase of the Vietnamese market. In this period, Chinese investment 
mainly focused on light industrial sector, consumer industry, and in the form of Joint 
venture with Vietnamese companies, the company with 100% foreign capital is 
limited. In the period 2000-2011, especially after 2001, when China joined WTO, 
Chinese investment in Vietnam was so strong. So far, China has more than 842 
investment projects in Vietnam with a total investment of more than $ 4.3 billion, 
ranked 14 out 96 countries investing in Vietnam, while, Vietnam has only 10 
investment projects in China with a total investment capital of $ 13 million, mainly 
focused on service sector. Two-way trade in 2011 reached $ 35.7 billion, in 2012 was 
$ 41 billion (Dong, 2012). 
Before the rise of China today and the past lessons and immediate and long-term 
strategy of Vietnam is strongly develop in all aspects, of which if economy is strong 
will lead to other strong ones. Vietnam sees  ASEAN as an important  means  through 
which  Vietnam can  promote  its  position. Through ASEAN, Vietnam is simply trying 
to moderate Chinese behavior through interdependence, though  indirectly. Simply, 
Vietnam is  too small to influence China through direct linkages. Only through full 
participation in Asean, including  the Asean free trade area (AFTA), Vietnam can 
attempt  to engage China in a degree of interdependence. Vietnam should continue  to 
use Asean to support its own agenda as well as use the annual Asean foreign minister's 
meeting, the  multilateral  approach  to security  issues, and the resolution of the south 
china sea disputes against China's wishes. Vietnam should further embrace the ARF's 
call for more military  transparency and confidence-building measures. Besides, 
Vietnam should also get involved in as many international organizations and regional 
bodies as possible, which implicitly  constrains  its independence. in its relationship 
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with China, Vietnam must remain cognizant, that “the more we identify with a group,  
the more likely we are to discriminate against out- groups" has tremendous implications 
for Vietnam security. Whereas Alexander Wendt suggests that a more developed 
collective self will lead to "another-help" security  policies. The current international 
system is as favorable to Vietnam as it has ever been. For its security concern, notably 
China, the only realistic way for Vietnam to cope with this is by engaging China in 
indirect  interdependence through its membership of Asean, and increasing  the 
economic development  of the country. Vietnam should strengthen cooperation, limit 
the disagreement, avoid confrontation, expand common points. The stable maintenance 
of friendship with China will bring many benefits for Vietnam. In contrast, if  this tie is 
pushed in the strained and confrontational state, it will only bring many disadvantages 
for Vietnam. The best choice of Vietnam’s China policy, in the current context, is the 
general strategy, include, firstly, efforts to strengthen the country, along with ASEAN 
member States, entice China more  involve in the international and regional issues, 
more active participation in regional mechanism institutions; attract the more active 
participation of Russia and the world major powers such as USA, Japan, India and EU 
on regional issues. This strategy will create a dynamic and flexible balance, ensuring 
the best place for Vietnam’s national security. Secondly, strengthening multifaceted tie 
with ASEAN members, especially with Laos and Campuchia. This will ensure 
Vietnam’s national security, especially its ability to handle the changes in the Sino-
Russian relations. Enhancing relations with Southeast Asian countries will ensure both 
the security environment and economic momentum and is also foundation to achieve 
consensus in settling the issues with China. 
China is so skilled in the application of pragmatism in relations with great powers, 
especially in relations with Russia and the USA. That’s what Vietnam should be very 
careful in handling issues in the relationship with Russia in particular and with great 
powers in general, especially with China to avoid falling into “ honey traps” in strategic 
competition between major  powers, in which small countries is very easy to become a 
victim. In relations with both Russia and China, Vietnam needs to keep independent 
and autonomous position to proactively adjust relations in an appropriate way, to keep 
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reasonable distance as not to fall into the entirely dependence position on these two 
countries, or fall into the orbit of this country against other country. 
Inheriting the good results of the Vietnam-Soviet relations, since the establishment 
of formal diplomatic relations, the Vietnam-Russia relationship has turned to a new 
page. This relationship was formed and based on the very basic facilities, such as the 
need for cooperation to develop socio-economic development, proximity and 
coincidence of stance and views on many international and regional issues, fine 
traditional friendship, solid legal foundation. Vietnam has made good advantage of the 
Russian factor in its policy of balancing relations with great powers, especially with 
China. This plays a very important role to implement the foreign policy of 
independence, self-reliance, openness, multilateralism and diversification of 
international relations, the proactive and active global integration of Vietnam. Vietnam 
attaches great importance to promote comprehensive relations with Russia as a great 
power and a traditional friendly country. Overall, Vietnam-Russian relation since the 
end of the Cold War has reached many achievements from  various fields of politics, 
economy, education, national defense and security to international cooperation on a 
range of important issues of security and external cooperation.  
Vietnam-Russian economic link in the period of 1991-1993 saw unprecedented 
decline. The volume of trade (1.911 billion rubles) between Viet Nam and Russia in 
1992 was only 10 % of Vietnam-Soviet Union trade turnover  in 1989 (Giap N. H., 
1999). Vietnam had to face great difficulties due to limited supply of essential items 
from Russia such as fuel, materials, equipment, machinery and spare parts. On the 
other hand, Vietnam’s traditional export items to Russian market  such as fruits, 
vegetables, food, agricultural products, handicrafts and light industry has shrunk 
sharply in Russian market. Vietnam and Russian economic and trade cooperation in 
the period 1994-1996 further saw  positive developments. Under the agreement, 
Vietnam continued to receive essential goods and equipment from Russia to serve all 
the works built by the Soviet Union. Vietnam also more active in the supply of goods 
to debt payment for Russia (each year more than $ 100 million). Vietnam-Russian 
trade turnover in 1994 reached $ 378.9 million, but turnover in 1995 and 1996 was 
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small just $ 453 million and $ 280 million. As of 1996, Russia has 36 ongoing 
projects with a capital of 160 million, of which 32 joint ventures, 02 of 100% of 
Russian owned enterprises and 02 of joint business agreement. Russia ranked 18
th
 
among 54 countries and territories investing in Viet Nam. Vietsovpetro Joint venture 
company is outstanding success of Vietnam-Russian economic cooperation. In 1994, 
this Joint venture exploited 7 million tones of crude oil, in 1996 was 68.2 million 
tones. The total oil sale from 1991 to 1997 reached $ 6.3 billion, its contribution to 
Vietnam’s budget was $ 3.4 billion (Giap N. H., 1999). During period of 1994-1996, 
many Vietnamese private companies operated successfully in Russia. The number of 
over 300 companies in the form of  100% of foreign owned capital or joint ventures 
between Vietnam-Russia with capital of about $ 200 million. The scope of activities 
of these companies are so diverse from export - import of consumer goods, materials, 
equipment manufacturing, public catering, tourism, services, investment, banking, 
insurance and education. From 1997 to the present, Vietnam and Russia further 
develop cooperation in all fields like oil and gas industry, energy and mining 
resources, mechanical engineering, metallurgy, electronics, ship building and repair, 
light industry, chemical industry, microbiological and pharmaceutical, agricultural 
and forest products processing, fishing and seafood processing, transportation, postal 
and aviation, construction, environmental protection, health protection; science and 
technology training; tourism and culture.  
The statistics from the Vietnam Ministry of Commerce show that in 2000, the 
total export turnover between Vietnam and Russia reached $ 367.1 million, of which 
exports to Russia was $ 122.5 million, imports from Russia was $ 244.6 million. In 
2004,  it amounted to $ 887.3 million, an increase of 142% compared to 2000, exports 
to Russia reached $ 671.2 million, an increase of 174%. In 2005, trade between the 
two countries further saw positive development, two-way import and export turnover 
reached $ 1.02 billion, up 14.5%. Vietnam’s trade deficit was $ 516 million. In 2006, 
export turnover reached $1.1 billion, up 8% compared with 2005, imports reached 
nearly $ 700 million (down 8.9% compared with 2005); export reached $ 400 million, 
5.87% increase over 2005;  $ 300 million deficit. Compare over the previous years, 
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trade deficit between Russia and Vietnam was 1/3, but recently, it has fallen to 1/1.5. 
In recent years, a number of key commodities exported to Russia increased relatively 
high: seafood increased 6 times ($60 million), apparel increased 69% ($ 31.3 million), 
rubber increased 54%, vegetables by 51%, footwear increased 89%...In 2006, imports 
from Russia slowed down, only $ 3003 million, by 73% over the same period, of 
which iron and steel reached 99 million (down 50%), machinery, appliances and spare 
parts reached $ 20.4 million (decreased 2 times). The most important field in 
coordinating economic activities between Vietnam and Russia is oil and gas, of which 
Vietsopetro-  the oil and gas joint venture, leading the bilateral cooperation. For years, 
this enterprise has achieved high production and commercial  targets, contributing 
greatly to Vietnamese state budget. As of early January 2006, Vietsopetro has earned 
$ 28.43 billion from crude oil export, of which Vietnam’s state budget and profit was 
$ 17.43 billion, Russia’s benefit was $ 5 billion. Besides exploration of oil and gas, 
Vietsopetro also exploit the available capacity to participate in technical services fro 
offshore petroleum foreign companies, which have singed contracts on exploration, 
exploitation and distribution of oil and gas with Vietnam. 
In the period 2000-2009, two-way trade turnover Russia-Vietnam increased 5-
fold from 367 million dollars to 1.83 billion dollars to stabilize commodity structure. 
In 2010, the Russian market is the second largest export commodity of Vietnam 24. 
Meanwhile, in the opposite direction, Russia is the largest source of imports of 14 
enterprises in Vietnam (Ha N. A., 2011, p. 65). Currently, Russia has 67 direct 
investment projects in Vietnam with a total registered capital of over 755 million 
dollars. Vietnam's investment in Russia has increased rapidly, currently has 18 
projects with a total investment of 1.7 billion dollars (Ha N. A., 2011, p. 65). 
According to the statistics from Vietnamese General Administration of  Customs that 
from 2010 onward, the balance of trade of Vietnam always deficit when trading in 
Russian market, from 2011, Vietnamese goods were strongly exported to this market, 
the trade balance has tilted toward Vietnam. In 2011, Russia is 22
nd
 largest trading 
partner of Vietnam (ranked 22
nd
 in terms of both exports and imports). In the 7 
months of 2012, the total value of goods exchanged between Vietnam and Russia was 
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$1.34 billion, an impressive growth of 34% over the same period last year. Trade 
turnover between Russia and Vietnam in 2012 reached the historic highs of nearly $ 4 
billion. Assistant President of Russia Elvira Nabiullina said that since 2006, the 
bilateral trade has more than triples. She also noted that the basis of the economic 
synergy between Vietnam and Russia is a combination of oil and gas industry. 
Currently there are several Russian groups working in Vietnam like “ Gazprom”, “ 
Lukoil”, “ TNK-BP”. In addition, there are great prospects of construction the first 
nuclear power plant in Vietnam (http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2012_07_30/83368983/.). 
Vietnam and Russia also signed an agreement on energy cooperation, the provision of 
equipment, research collaboration, joint venture establishment in the fields of 
mechanics, coal mining. The power plants: Hoa Binh, Thac Mo, Tri An, Yaly…also 
have received cooperation,  investment, equipment supply, technology transfer of 
Russia. Power Machines JSC of Russia has cooperated with Uong Bi Thermal Power 
and, Pha Lai Thermal Power companies in equipment supply. The Russian’s energy 
technology export group (Technopromexport-TPE) was involved in the design, 
construction and supply of equipment with total capital of $ 87.7 million for Yaly 
hydropower Plant, supply of mechanical equipment for Da Mi hydropower Plant. The 
two plants were put into operation and provided electricity to the Vietnam’s national 
electricity system. 
In investment area, Russia is gradually becoming one of the key partner in the 
strategy to attract foreign capital in Vietnam. Russian’s FDI in Vietnam is increasing, 
has been actively contributing to the economic reform and development of Vietnam. 
From 1998 to late 2002, when compared the scale of FDI in Vietnam, the Russian 
Federation accounted for m1.8% of the total of 4,215 projects and 3.8% of the total 
capital of over $ 20 billion. Russia ranked 9
th
 investor in Vietnam (after Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, France, Virgin islands, UK). Russian 
investment mainly focused on the construction industry for 23 projects ( with a total 
investment of $143.5 million occupied 50% of projects and 53.15% registered capital 
of Russia in Vietnam) and services for 16 projects with total registered capital of $ 70 
million (35% of projects and registered capital of 25.93%). The field of agriculture - 
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forestry attracted 7 projects with a total registered capital of $ 37,5 million (15% of 
total projects and registered capital of 13.89%). Russia's FDI present in Vietnam’s 
important economic sectors as oil and gas, energy, engineering, chemical industry, 
metallurgy, agro-processing industry, forestry and seafood. As of 2009, the total 
investment capital of Russia to Vietnam at about $ 300 million (excluding 
Vietsovpettro -Petroleum Joint Venture) with 55 projects in the power sector, 
engineering, agriculture, ranked 23
rd
 out of 81 countries and territories investing in 
Vietnam. Cumulatively, on 31/12/2012, Vietnam has 14.522 valid projects with a 
total registered capital of $ 210.5 billion, of which the sectors of processing industry,  
manufacturing accounted for the highest proportion with 50,3% of the total 
investment, followed by the field of the real estate business (23.6%), accommodation 
services catering (5%). As of now, there are 100 countries and territories investing in 
Vietnam, in which Japan is the largest investor with a total registered capital of $ 28.6 
billion, respectively, followed by Taiwan, Singapore and Korea. In the first 6 months 
of 2013, Russia ranked third with a total registered capital increase is new and 1,015 
billion, accounting for 9.7% of the total capital investment (http://fia.mpi.gov.vn). 
Vietsopetro is rated as one of 10 oil companies in the world with the highest 
profitability. Moscow – Mill helicopters production company is one of the project 
partners to build repair and warranty plant in Da Nang city to serve the needs of the 
entire East Asian region. Mill branch in Vietnam mainly serve to prolong the life of 
helicopters manufactured by Soviet and Russia. Ulianopxky- an automobile 
production factory, installing a production line in Vietnam with 5 year operation 
license. In 2003, the factory provided 1200 cars. Treliabinsc-heavy tractors 
manufacturing plant is also on stereotype with spare parts were assembled in 
Vietnam.  
Russia is also one of the investment areas of Vietnam investors. As of 2009, there 
are 11 investment projects to the Russian Federation (occupied 11% of projects of 
Vietnam, outward investment) with a total registered capital of $34 million, ranked  
2
nd
 in terms of  total outward investment of Vietnam, and ranked  3
rd
 in terms of 
number of  the projects after Laos (33 projects) and the USA (14 projects). Vietnam 
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businesses primarily invested in the fields of industry, agriculture and forestry, 
services and ranks third after Iraq and Laos with 11 valid projects. As reported by the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, since the 
beginning of 2013, Vietnam has invested $ 1.4 billion into the Russian Federation. 
This is a project of  National Petroleum Corporation Vietnam in the expansion of 
Russian-Vietnamese joint venture "Rusvietpetro" to develop oil fields in the Nenets 
autonomous region of Russia.( http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2013_04_09/110215886/). 
As of 20/03/2013, Vietnam has 742 investment projects abroad with a total registered 
investment of $ 15.5 billion in 59 countries and territories.  
Vietnam-Russia relations after the Cold War, so far, has been more than 20 years of 
development. Vietnam has determined the form and framework of its bilateral relations 
with Russia.  
Vietnam has been successful in regulating its relationship of comprehensive 
cooperation from basis of  ideological relations to “ strategic partner”, on the basis of 
equality, mutual benefit and meeting its interests in the new situation. Through 
advancers in the Vietnam-Russia relations, it can be seen the geopolitical and economic 
factors, especially Russia’s calculation fro the region, Vietnam still an important partner 
that could help Russia back to the region with the position of a great power. For its part, 
Vietnam has benefited important politico-security and economic interests in relations 
with Russia. The good maintenance of its relations with Russia has helped Vietnam 
access the modern defense technology of Russia in order to modernize its defense 
forces. From the Cold War to the present, Vietnam has not only received Russia’s great 
help in the process of its economic recovery and development, but also received the 
strong support to restore and maintain a number of important industrial items which the 
Soviet Union built for Vietnam before. Currently, Vietnam is stepping up cooperation 
with Russia in the construction of infrastructure items of energy and nuclear power, 
such as Hoa Binh and Yaly hydropower plants and the coming first nuclear power plant 
in Ninh Thuan province. Inherit and promote the achievements of the Vietnam-Soviet 
Union, Vietnam has raised its bilateral relation to “strategic partnership” relation and 
cooperated with Russia in all fields. However, lessons learned from the past, Vietnam is 
 46 
 
not consistently advocated an alliance with Russia against other countries, particularly 
against China, as China had previously claimed Vietnam was allied with the Soviet 
Union against China in 80s, that has led to the Chinese border war against Vietnam in 
March 1979 in order to “Teach Vietnam a lesson”. This was one of reasons that made 
Vietnam-China relations come to deadlock, hostility,  lasted until 1991, when the two 
leaders of the two countries decided to close the past and normalize the Vietnam-China 
relations. Along with strengthening political relations with Russia, since 1991, Vietnam 
has strived to promote its economic relations on par with political ties, and corresponds 
to the potential and expectations of both countries. To this point, compare the economic 
relations, trade and investment between Vietnam and Russia with a number of other 
countries like China, USA and Japan may not be great, reversely, also  not 
commensurate with the degree of political relations. Although Vietnam has a long-term 
economic relations and good knowledge of Russian market, but in order to achieve new 
progress, Vietnam must have an overall policy and long-term ties with Russia with the 
principle of “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, not against any third country”. 
Vietnam should continue to strengthen its cooperation in the economic sector that both 
Vietnam and Russia have advantage and strength, such as exploitation of oil and gas 
and developing new energy projects, such as Ninh Thuan nuclear power plant, further 
expand trade relations between the two countries with high quality goods to meet the 
needs of the market. Economically, Viet Nam and Russia have great potential, 
especially in the field of energy (nuclear power), oil and gas, mining, 
telecommunications, technical engineering…that is not commensurate with the size of 
the strategic partnership. Viet Nam should pay special attention on economic 
cooperation with Russia. Russian investment in Viet Nam is not only economic 
benefits, but also great sense of security defense, and independence maintenance of Viet 
Nam. Bilateral economic cooperation should focus on 4 main fields: oil and gas, energy 
and electricity, investment and trade. In addition to that, Viet Nam needs to have new 
agreement to expand cooperation in these fields such as the joint venture with a third 
party and investment outside the Vietnamese border. In addition to the priority of the oil 
and gas cooperation, Viet Nam needs build projects such as hydropower, thermal 
power, nuclear power by Russian equipment, technology ( and capital from both sides). 
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Initially, Viet Nam should to create favorable conditions for Russia to bid to provide the 
technology for nuclear power plants in Viet Nam as well as more attraction of Russian 
investment in Viet Nam, especially large corporations such as Gazprom, Lukhoi, 
Alfagroup, Rusall, Power machine…on the oil and gas industry, electric power, mining, 
telecommunications, mechanical engineering, rial transport and road…Viet Nam should 
also have policies to encourage its investment in Russia, especially in the areas that Viet 
Nam has strengths such as production of consumer goods, foodstuffs, construction 
materials. Request Russian government to give more ODA for Viet Nam in the coming 
time to upgrade and modernize USSR’s previous assisted works, especially create 
favorable condition for large cooperative projects in the power and transportation 
sectors (subway construction). Viet Nam needs to expand joint venture with Russia in 
new fields such as mining, financial and banking services, telecommunications and 
defense equipment. In addition, Vietnam should strengthen its customs cooperation, 
facilitate the paperwork, the records processing time for business. Vietnamese 
government need request Russian government to grant long-term visa Vietnamese 
businessmen as well as soon announce the criteria and conditions of quality of export 
goods to the Russian market. In addition, Viet Nam needs enhance measures to trade 
promotion, advertisement of Vietnamese high quality goods. Vietnamese trading 
centers need to set up in major cities of Russia. 
In sum, in relations with Russia, Vietnam has been successful in adjusting its 
foreign policy from the relation based on ideological ties to long-term strategic 
partnership based on equality and mutual benefit. Vietnam has also achieved a number 
of important benefits of security, politics and economy. 
 3.4. Vietnamese response to the Sino-Russian relations in terms of 
defense 
 3.4.1. Security and defense tie between Vietnam and Russia 
         Field of security and defense is one of the traditional areas of cooperation 
between Vietnam and Russia. Previously, 90% of military weapons was offered by 
the Soviet Union. For Vietnam, this tie contributes to the strengthening of its national 
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defense and security. For Russia, this tie facilitates its influential role in Vietnam and 
the Asia-Pacific region and bring revenues from the sales of weapons to Vietnam. 
Since 1995, the two Defense Ministries has been very positive to coordinate the 
implementation of the exchange of military delegation at all levels, including the 
exchange of “ the annual resort program for General level”. Both sides sent 
delegations of Secretary of Defense and Public Security, mutual visits made by the 
delegations of General Department of Intelligence under Ministry of Defense, General 
Department of Security under Public Security Ministry, in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004 and signed the memorandum on intelligence sharing related the international 
and regional security situation, especially the terrorist activities and the fight against 
international terrorism, counter-narcotics…  
          Also since 1999, every year, the two sides held meetings of the 
intergovernmental Committee of Vietnam-Russia on military technical cooperation. 
From 2003 to the present, the total contract value of military weapons import from 
Russia reached several billion of usd. From the mere procurement of weapons and 
military technical equipment from Russia, Vietnam and Russia started to implement 
of technology transfer of repairing, upgrading and improving production in Vietnam. 
Russia coordinated with Vietnam both on scientific and technological research in the 
Vietnamese institutes and building centers of technical training and weapons and 
equipment repair. By the end of 1990s, Vietnam has started buying some Russian 
naval engineering vehicles and Vietnam can also produce these equipment by Russian 
design. Russia also helped Vietnam upgrade its air defense system by modernizing its 
modern air defense missile complexes of S-125 "Pechora". In recent years, Vietnam 
has bought many Russian Su30K2 fighters and a number of S300 anti-aircraft missile 
system. Costal mobile complex “Bastion” with “ Yakhont” auto-positioning 
supersonic missiles against ships and “ Igla” air defense complexes. In 1998, Vietnam 
signed agreements on military technical cooperation with Russia with emphasis that 
the expansion that military-technical cooperation will be carried out under the 
direction of modernizing the Navy, the Air Force, the missile defense system as well 
as expansion “ The Tropical center "- where unique experience for the activities of 
 49 
 
Russian technology in tropical condition. (Ha N. A., 2007, pp. 341-369). In 2003, 
Vietnam signed a contract with Russia to buy Uran missiles worth $ 120 million, and 
contracts worth $300 million till 2005 to replace the  weapon of the two Vietnamese 
Missile Divisions (replace C-75 missiles produced in 1965 by the modern missile C-
300 PMU-1). In November 2005, the Fleet of Pacific Fleet of Russia landed in Da 
Nang (Hiep, 2007, pp. 358-372). Vietnam’s military cooperation with Russia was 
upgraded into new height. As Russian President Putin explained that upgrade will 
mean moving from normal trade relations to collaboration in research, production and 
manufacturing weapons as well as military equipment, establishment of service 
centers, warranty and upgrade weapons, cooperation in exporting weapons and 
military equipment to third country markets. In recent years, Vietnam has signed a 
series of major contracts to buy Russian weapons. By the end of 2009, during Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Russia, Vietnam contacted to buy 6 kilo-class 
submarines from Russia. The value of the contract was $ 2 billion. This is one of the 
largest contract for export of Russian naval weapons in the history. The Project 636 
submarines of Vietnam navy will be equipped with the Club-S missile system.  In 
2011 and 2012, Russia has delivered 12 aircrafts for Vietnam. Vietnam also received 
a total of 6 project 10412 patrol ship of Russia, worth nearly $15 million per vessel. 
The second largest project  in the small warships segment was program of providing 
and producing Molnia Class ships under license. (Hiep, 2007, pp. 358-372). In the 
early twenty-first century, Vietnam has purchased 04 class missile boats, 02 
"lightning", missile patrol boats, 11 fighters Su-27. In January 2007, Vietnam 
Ministry of Defense has signed with the Russian weapon import export company a 
contract worth $300 million, according to which by the end of 2007, Russia supply 
"3.9” class corvette of type 11661 and na advanced  ‘Linpao” missile system 
equipped with anti-ship cruise missile. Before that, with the help from the Northern 
shipyards of Russia, in early 2003, Vietnam has made in Ho Chi Minh City class C-
2200 corvette, equipped with anti-aircraft missiles "dagger". The small and medium-
sized shipbuilding companies of Russia also agreed in 2006 to conduct 10 "lightning" 
rocket ship  in the Vietnam shipyard equipped with missile "Uranus-E" (Hiep, 2007, 
p. 366). In early 2009, Russia signed a contract with Vietnam worth nearly $ 400 
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million to provide 8 Su-30Mk2 fighters without weapons attached. In February 2010, 
Russia singed second contract to supply Vietnam 12 Su-30Mk2 fighters with air 
weapons, valued at nearly $ 1 billion. This contract also provides aviation weapons 
and spare parts for the Su-30Mk2 of the first batch ordered in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, 
Vietnam received 02 inshore advanced missile defense system K300 Bastion-P. In 
2011, Vietnam received 02 missile guardian ships Dinh Tien Hoang and Ly Thai To. 
This contract was signed in 2006, worth $350 million. In his recent visit to China in 
May 2013, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said the total of 6 kilo-class 
submarines, that Vietnam contracted to buy from Russia, will be put into service in 
2016 in the Vietnamese Navy. “ the submarine contract is a vivid manifestation of the 
friendship and trust between the two countries” 
(http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2013_07_04/117226913/). In addition, with the support of 
Russia, Vietnam will establish submariner training center at Cam Ranh Bay, Khanh 
Hoa province, Vietnam. So far, many Vietnamese military experts was educated at the 
universities of Russia and is fluent in Russian language. The total number of military 
experts have been trained in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is 13 
thousand people. From 2004 to now, the Russian Federation Agency on cooperation 
in military Science and Technology has provided the Vietnam Ministry of Defense  
with 50 civil scholarships. Russian President Putin has approved the Degree on 
providing preferential scholarship to Vietnam on the basis of free training at training 
institutes of Russian Defense Ministry, starting in 2006-2007. Vietnamese  military 
relation with Russia is considered stable, solid, high efficiency, contributing to 
increase mutual understanding and trust (Vo Dai Luoc & Le Bo Linh, 2005, p. 73)The 
security and defense is not only traditional cooperative area, but also more important, is 
one of areas to protect Vietnamese territorial integrity and national security. So, 
cooperation should be actively promoted and priority must be given in the Vietnam-
Russia strategic partnership. Maintaining and expanding annual exchange of high 
raking military delegation; early establishment of the Vietnamese-Russian strategic 
dialogue mechanism at Deputy-ministerial level of three Ministries: Defense, Public 
Security and Foreign Affairs, is required. Besides, new form of cooperation such as 
joint exercise for rescue, sea rescue, anti-terrorism need to be considered. Continue to 
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maintain the traditional visits of Russian Navy Ships to Viet Nam, especially, the joint 
venture plants to produce weapons, defense equipment in Vietnam. Further cooperation 
with Russia to expand training military officers for Vietnam. 
          To put the Russo-Vietnamese strategic partnership into essential, effective 
and mutually beneficial way; further improve reliability and increase its position and 
importance, Viet Nam should do its best in terms of politics. Although in its both 
thinking and external actions in the past, at the present and in future, Viet Nam has 
always considered Russia as not only major power, the traditional friend, the leading 
strategic partner, but also as “ natural ally”, especially on national security. However, 
for more effective, Viet Nam should put this relationship in a spirit of mutual benefit, 
avoid bias “sentimentism”. Vietnam should also continue to exchange high-ranking 
delegations to create trust between the two countries, while expanding relations 
between the ministries, branches, unions of friendship and localities. For problems in 
relations between the two countries, Vietnam should pay attention to the interests, 
motives and position of Russia, so that there is clear direction and proactively solve 
problems exist. Vietnam need to be patient in advocating negotiations with Russia on 
the overall debt problem, the Vietnamese community in Russia, on the basis of 
cooperation, mutual benefit as well as immediate and long-term benefits. Political ties 
should  strongly strengthened, provide basis for improving the efficiency of economic 
cooperation through several measures like strengthening exchanges of high ranking 
delegations, exchange of delegations of parliament, ministries, localities, gradually turn 
the interactions into a regular mechanism; promoting the relations between the ruling 
parties; increasing the exchange of information, experience, and coordinating with the 
Russia in solving the problems of democracy, human rights and maintenance of security 
and internal political stability; closely cooperating in the forums and organizations on 
regional and international issues of mutual concern; promoting ASEAN mechanism 
plus Russia. Viet Nam also promotes its public diplomatic activities, enhance 
exchanges and interactions between socio-political associations of provinces, cities of 
the Viet Nam and Russia. Taking advantage of support and emotion of Russian people 
to Viet Nam to strengthen tie of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. 
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Strengthening two-way information to make ministries, businesses to have better 
understanding of situation, prospects and potential for long term plan of business, 
cooperation of mutual benefit. Of course, cooperation in the fields of science, 
technology, education, culture, arts and tourism also should be further promoted, 
especially  in human resource training and transfer of technology, protection of the 
intellectual rights, teaching Russian language and culture, attraction of tourists, citizen 
protection,  export of Vietnamese labor. 
3.4.2. Security and Defense tie between Viet Nam and China 
Recognizing the importance of China, just as a neighbor and a great power for 
security, development of Vietnam as well as in the region. Vietnam continues to attach 
importance to handle this relationship, particularly special attention must be paid to the 
intentions, objectives and policies of China. Vietnam-China relations has normalized in 
the international context of having many advantages. The trend of cooperation and 
dialogue, focus on economic development has created opportunities for both countries 
to expand international relations, utilizing the external conditions for economic 
development, solving problems by peaceful means. Since the normalization of relation, 
on the basis of the principles recognized on the Joint Communique  and joint 
Declaration, the relationship of traditional friendship, mutual trust, mutual benefit 
between the two countries have developed rapidly and gained significant achievements 
in all areas of political, economic, security, defense, education, culture as well as 
territorial boundary issues exist between the two countries. Overall, compared to the 
overall relationship between the two countries in history, it can be seen that the 
Vietnam-China relations after normalization have seen many changes. This relation is 
built on the national-state interest of each country rather than based on ideology. 
Vietnam continues to attach great importance to this special relationship, well 
understanding two faceted policy of China in order to be flexible or assertive with 
China in an appropriate manner; firmly keeping the spirit of self-reliance, developing 
internal resource in combination with enlisting external resource; combine bilateral 
diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy;  Closely incorporates the fields of politics, 
diplomacy, economics, security and defense, culture, ideology with more focus on the 
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economic relations with China. The overall development and stability of relations 
between Vietnam and China has not only met the basic and long-term  aspirations  of 
the people of the two countries, but also in line with the trend of peace, stability and 
development in the region and around the world.  
Since 1991, security and Defense tie between Viet Nam and China has strongly 
promoted. In the Joint Statement 21 June 2013, Viet Nam and China actively 
evaluated the 4th Defense Strategic Dialogue at Deputy Defense Ministerial level, 
agreed to maintain high-level contacts between two militaries, better promote the role 
of mechanism for the strategic defense dialogue and direct telephone line between the 
Department of Defense to enhance mutual trust; strengthen the exchange of 
experiences of the party and political work in the military as well as personnel 
training and exchanges of young officers. Viet Nam and China also compromised to 
implement border cooperation agreement between the two Departments of Defense, 
continue to implement the land border patrol, deepening the border cooperation on 
land and at sea. In 2013, the two sides will launch two joint patrols between the two 
Navies in the Gulf Of Tonkin; strengthen exchange and coordination in the 
multiregional security issues. Exchanging and researching the new form and new 
content in the deployment of Defense cooperation, deepening the cooperation 
between the two militaries. 
On 22 June 2013, two Vietnamese warships HQ 011 and  HQ012 with more than 
200 military officers and crew have started to participate in the 15
th
 combined patrol 
with Chinese Navy and visited Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province, China. So far, 
the Navy of the two countries has conducted the joint patrol 15 times. Vietnam and 
China military has conducted many search and rescue exercises on the sea. It could be 
said that cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf has implemented smoothly. Since 1991, 
Vietnam and China have actively solved the problems that exist between the two 
countries, especially the territorial boundary issues left over history. In 1999, the two 
countries signed an agreement on the delimitation of the border; in 2000, the Tonkin 
Gulf Delimitation and Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement was also 
signed. "Agreement on Vietnam-China land boundary in 1999 and the agreement on 
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the Vietnam-China of the Tonkin Gulf forms a solid legal base to border, territory 
management and achieve the objective of building Vietnam-China border of of peace, 
friendship, long-term stability and create motivation to further strengthen bilateral ties 
between the two countries " said Le Cong Phung- Vietnamese Deputy Foreign 
Minister (Phung, 2000, p. 23). Regarding the South China Sea (East Sea), the leaders 
of the two countries repeatedly asserted through friendly negotiation, peaceful  and 
satisfactory settlement of all matters arising from the sea between the two countries 
on the basis of international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the sea 
(UNCLOS 1982), the spirit of the declaration of Code of conduct (DOC) in the South 
China Sea and suitable friendly relations between the two countries, contributing to 
maintaining peace, stability and cooperation in the region. For infringements of the 




 Vietnam-China Defense Strategy Dialogue just held in Beijing on 5 
June 2013, in which the two Ministries of Defense has agreed to construct security 
telephone line directly connected the two countries’ defense ministries to further 
enhance contact and exchange  between senior  military leaders of the two countries 
through negotiation and friendship. To strengthen strategic trust between the two 
militaries, Vietnamese Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh emphasized 5 specific 
ways of cooperation including special interest to the party and political work in the 
army; promote the exchange of information between the strategic agencies to properly 
assess the situation, taking Defense Strategy Dialogue at Deputy Minister’s level as 
center in assessing the situation and offering effective solutions for cooperation; 
enhance cooperation between navies, coast guards of the two countries with the aim 
of the two navies cooperation is the highlights for the two party leaders of the two 
countries have a favorable environment in making decisions at the strategic level, 
instruct the two navies met, use the hotline between the two countries’ naval 
commanders to exchange necessary information (TTXVN, 2013).  In the security 
area, the relationship between the two Public security Ministries has increasingly 
strengthened in a more comprehensive and practical way. So far, two ministries of 
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Public Security has held Cooperation Conference for prevention of crime three times. 
Two ministries has also regularly exchanged high-ranking visits . In the visit to 
Vietnam on 23 October 2012, Chinese Minister and Vietnamese Minister of Public 
Security co-chaired the 3
rd
 Conference on cooperation for prevention of crime. Both 
sides agreed that, over the past years, two ministries of Public security has closely 
cooperated, actively implemented the common achieved perception and effectively 
fight criminal activities that has threatened the security and order of the two countries; 
jointly safeguard peace and stability at border areas. Police forces of the two countries 
continue coordinate in prevention and fight against crime such as terrorism, 
transnational crime, trafficking, sale and transportation of weapons, explosives, 
women and children trafficking, gambling, production, transportation and trade of 
drug, and other economic crimes (Vu, 2012). Police of the two countries further 
strengthen cooperation in the field of domestic security, effectively fight against 
destructive, divisive operations of the hostile forces; intensify professional exchange 
information and coordinate investigation in accordance with the provisions of the law 
of each country; and intensify cooperation on the forums within ASEAN-China. In 
relations with China, Vietnam also has successful in its foreign policy adjustments, 
establishment of comprehensive strategic partnership with China. Bilateral relations 
between Vietnam and China has developed extensively in all areas of politics, 
diplomacy, economy, security, culture and education. 
 Responding to the Sino and Russian cooperation, Vietnam  has the appropriate 
response, the necessary adjustments in its foreign policy to maximize the advantages 
of this relationship to serve the objectives of security, development and influence in 
its foreign policy. Viet Nam has promoted partnership with both countries in many 
aspects such as political diplomacy, economy, defense, education. Since the end of the 
Cold War, Vietnam has many changes in its foreign policy toward Russia, especially 
by upgrading its relations to strategic partnership, focusing on economic relation, 
defense. Vietnam’s China foreign policy has also changed so much since the end of 
the Cold War, from the normalization of relation to comprehensive strategic 
partnership. Responding to the Sino-Russian cooperation, depend on each period, 
based on its real power, Vietnam has appropriate policies in relation to each country, 
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in each sector of cooperation to balance relations with these two countries. The 
changes in Vietnamese foreign toward China and Russia have been proven in terms of 
economy and defense. Since the end of the Cold War, the priority in the Vietnamese 
foreign policy toward Russia is cooperation in defense and economy, while economic 
cooperation with China is a priority. 
 Responding to the Sino- Russian competition, after the Cold War, Viet Nam 
also has the appropriate adjustments to avoid direct conflict with each country. 
Vietnam did not express their views on issues that China and Russia has disputes or 
conflicts. Policy of balancing relations with great powers has helped Vietnam avoid 
negative relations from these two powers. Vietnam did not go with Russia against 
China, not ally with China against Russia. This has helped Vietnam get a peaceful 
environment to develop its social economy.  
          Since the end of the Cold war,  in response to the Sino-Russian relations, 
Vietnam has gradually showed an active and dynamic way of handling relations with 
Russia and China in the direction of balancing, making full most favorable conditions 
from the positive impact of this relationship in order to serve its socio-economic 
development, political stability, independence, sovereignty and national security. 
Vietnam has been actively renewing its foreign policy in relations with great powers, 
politico-economic centers in general, and with Russia and China in particular. The 
simultaneous development of relations with both Russia and China, on the one hand, 
helped Vietnam success in attracting investment capital, technology, markets of these 
two countries, on the other hand, helped Vietnam maintain political stability, strengthen 
national security as well as enhance its position in the international arena. Vietnam has 
applied its foreign policy towards balancing of interests in relations with Russia and 
China, not as to these two countries manipulate, impose or entice, so that Vietnam’s 
position was improved significantly. Relations with Russia and China in particular, and 
with other key major countries are generally related to the security and development 
strategy in Vietnam. It can be said that in the relations with Russia and China after the 
Cold war, Vietnam has changed, adjusted properly, cleverly and exploited the positive 
aspects of the Sino-Russian relations and has limited the adverse compromise to 
security, development and influence of Vietnam. In order to better respond to the 
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context of changing in the Sino-Russian relations, Viet Nam should have reasonable, 
proactive and flexible policies to ensure its national interests before the evolution of the 
Sino-Russian relations. Vietnam need to promote the Vietnam-Russian and Vietnam-
Chinese relations, contributing the balance of forces on the basis of consistent goals of 
peace, independence, autonomy and territorial integrity. Viet Nam needs  diversify it 
relations in order to take advantage of favorable conditions to develop the country. Do 
not go with this party against other party,  do not place Russia and China in awkward 
position, to choose Vietnam with one side or the other, because if place Russia and 
China in such way, Vietnam will suffer loses. Viet Nam also needs to avoid being 
pushed into the situation for the relationship with this party but destruct relationship 
with the other party. Viet Nam should be cautious in expressing its view on issues 
related to Russia and China, especially the issues that two sides still have contradiction 
and conflict of interests. At the same time, Viet Nam needs to relations balancing policy 
with both Russia and China, as in the present context, due to the location of Vietnam, so 
both China and Russia are taking advantage of relations with Vietnam. Vietnam needs 
to stand firm on the comprehensive and long-term benefits of the country to keep 
balance. However, in each period, Vietnam should prioritize relations with each country 
on each particular sector, for the development and security of the country. 
On the other hand, Vietnam needs to develop relationship, create more deepened 
interdependence in its relations with Russia and China to limit the negative impact 
caused by the relations between these two countries. As a small country, so Vietnam 
should strengthen regional cooperation, attaching itself to the region, particularly 
ASEAN countries in order to provide support for Vietnam in its relations with the two 
countries; strongly promote its relations with other great powers like USA, EU, India 
and Japan, cleverly use relations with these countries to counterbalance, and to impact 
on the Vietnam’s relationship with Russia and China.  In certain extent, Vietnam can 
also take advantage of the contradictions and differences in strategic interests between 
China and Russia in order to serve the interests of Vietnam. The final and the most 
important thing is that Vietnam must increase its inner strength to cope successfully 
with the changes in Russo-Chinese relations. Over time, the Vietnam-Chinese 
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relations, Vietnam-Russian relations have seen many major changes. To promote 
relations with China and Russia in the coming time, Vietnam should exploit the 
advantages of cooperation in every relationship, do not let this relation thwart other 
relation. Vietnam should keep steadfast goal of peace, independence, autonomy and 
territorial integrity. Vietnam supports Russia and China to strengthen their bilateral 
relations, contributing to the promotion of peace, stability, security in the region and 




CHAPTER 4:  
CONCLUSION 
         Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam attaches great importance to relations 
with China, consolidates and develops the framework of Vietnam-China trusted 
cooperation by 16-word motto of “ friendly neighborliness, comprehensive cooperation, 
long-term stability and direction to future”. Relation with China is vital important issue 
to the security and development of Vietnam, because China is big neighbor, has 
traditional and long historical ties with Vietnam. Vietnam also considered the 
relationship with Russian Federation is the primary importance in relation to the 
traditional friendly countries. Russia today is no longer a key ally that help Vietnam 
ensure the security and defense, but has the role of “ relation balance” with great 
powers, including China. Russia can support to Vietnam in the field of science and 
technology, including military technology. It is the goal of the foreign policy of  
Vietnam in relations with Russia and China. Since the end of the Cold war, in response 
to the changes in the Sino-Russian relation, Vietnam has gradually adjusted its foreign 
policy, evaluated the nature of changes in the Sino-Russian relation, on the basis of 
undertaking that redefine relations and have proper response to Russia and China-one of 
great powers related to security and development strategy of Vietnam. After the Cold 
War, Vietnam’s foreign policy pays special attention to the factor of relation balancing 
with the major powers. Vietnam- a small and middle country has conducted its foreign 
policy in harmony with the response to change in the Sino-Russian relations. Vietnam’s 
policy of balancing relations with Russia and China in particular and with great powers 
in general is self-help policy, based on itself, consolidate its power in relation to other 
countries, and seek to resolve its weaknesses. In relations with Russia and China, 
Vietnam’s thinking in foreign policy making has also changed.  Vietnam has seen 
Russia and China is a friend and partner to protect its national interests, but not for 
Russia and China in its foreign policy. Drawing lessons learned from past failures. Due 
to rely on Soviet policy in its foreign relations, Vietnam was imposed sanctions and 
implemented deeply hostile policy by the US, the West and China, especially after 
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Vietnam’s invasion on Cambodia. Vietnam was forced into a situation where space for 
international activities was narrowed. In addition to a comprehensive partnership with 
the Soviet Union, Vietnam did not have normal relations with other major countries. 
Vietnam was under siege, economic sanctions, political isolation and was falling into 
heavy socio-economic crisis, threatening the security and survival of the country. 
Therefore, Vietnam has actively and determined to carry out the policy of “no alliance, 
no confrontation” in relations with Russia and China. This is the essence of relation 
balancing policy of Vietnam. This also always makes sure for Vietnam to have some 
other options in case of trouble. It can be confirmed that, since the end of the Cold War, 
the foreign policy of Vietnam has changed much. Firstly, it is a policy based mainly on 
itself ( self-help policy), an independent and autonomous policy. Secondly, in relations 
with partners, Vietnam implemented “ no lean one-sided policy” and thirdly, Vietnam is 
ready to be friends with all countries based on national-state interests. With the 
characteristics, it can be said, thinking in Vietnam’s foreign policy has shifted from 
emotion to reason, based on national interests. And to do that, Vietnam has set the way 
of  balancing relations with other countries, especially with the great powers in the 
world. Russia and China are the great powers that has capability of governing the 
contemporary  international relations. As  great powers, it is likely that Russia and 
China will seek to impose the policies on Vietnam- a small and middle country, having 
an important position in geography, politics and potential economic development. 
Containing the small countries in developing orbit consistent with the benefit of a great 
powers or take advantage of small countries to serve their strategic goals- that a 
common objective in the foreign policy of great powers in general and Russia and 
China in particular. Therefore. Vietnam should have wise policy to exploit the positive 
aspects of the Sino-Russia relationship. Being independence and activeness  will help 
Vietnam more clear and sensible in recognizing timely the changes in policy strategy of 
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